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Abstract 
In this paper, we will study Lee, Kim and Yoo, a verifier 
password typed key agreement scheme and demonstrate that the 
scheme is not secure. Then, the authors will propose an enhanced 
verifier typed key agreement scheme relied on Lee, Kim and 
Yoo scheme and demonstrate that the propose scheme resists 
against password guessing attack and stolen verifier attack. The 
authors are claimed that the proposed scheme is more secure and 
efficient compare with Lee, Kim and Yoo. 
Keywords: password, key agreement scheme, verifier-typed, 
password guessing attack, stolen verifier attack.
1. Introduction 
Password-based authenticated key agreement has recently 
received high attention because it plays an important role 
to employ an authenticated key agreement schemes. In 
general, classical password schemes require only a human 
memorable shared between the entities. However, 
password-based key agreement schemes are prone to 
password guessing attacks, because the user often select 
the password so that it can be easily memorized, which 
means that they are likely to be much easier to guess than 
randomly selected passwords.  
 
The key agreement protocol is one of the important 
techniques in public key cryptography similar to 
encryption and digital signature schemes. Such scheme 
allow two or more entities to exchange information over 
insecure channel and agree on a shared session key, which 
can employed later for secure communication between the 
entities. Therefore, secure key agreement scheme serve as 
basic building block for constructing high level of 
security. Secure communication requires only trusted 
entities that have a copy of secret key, while secret key 
can guarantee confidentiality, user authentication, and 
message integrity. In network we should able to securely 
distribute keys over a distance at a timely manner. It seems 
that, key distribution is the main problem and should be as 
hard as the cryptography scheme and should be able to 
ensure that only trusted entities have the copy of the secret 
key. Most schemes have an aim is to construct key on 
every scheme execution. In this case, the keying 
information define static key which will result each time 
the scheme is implemented by a given pair of entities. 
Schemes involving such fixed keys are insecure under 
known-key attacks.   
 
On the other hand, dynamic key protocol is established by 
a group of entities differ on each execution. Dynamic key 
is also denoted as session key establishment. In this case 
the session key is dynamic, and it is generally intended 
that the scheme is invulnerable to known-key attacks [1]. 
It is preferable that each entity in a key establishment 
scheme is able to find out the correct identity of others 
which may gain access to the resulting key, including 
prevention of any illegal entity from deducing the same 
key. This needs identifications of both entities and the 
secret key [2]. However, the first two-party key agreement 
is the Diffie and Hellman scheme [3]. But, in fact Diffie 
and Hellman scheme is defenseless to man-in-middle 
attack because entities engaged with the scheme and have 
no channel to authenticate each other.   
 
Also, password-typed scheme is vulnerable to dictionary 
attack since many entities tend to select memorable 
passwords of relatively low entropy [4]. In password-
typed key agreement scheme the data depicted from the 
password is entirely common between the entities. In this 
case the hacker can get access to private messages, and 
then he can pretend any entity. To a key agreement 
scheme running in centralized approach, it is vulnerable to 
stolen-verifier attack, and the hacker who gets the verifier 
from the server will attempt to impersonate any entity by 
agree on a session key with the server.  
 
Passwords can be simply guessed when entity selected his 
own password in document [5]. Storing message version 
of password on server is unsecure. This weakness is 
existed in all widely used schemes.  
 
However, the suggested scheme is secure against 
dictionary attacks as long as we use only one time keys 
with server. The suggested scheme also offers great 
forward secrecy even when one key is revealed the 
following session keys will not be revealed. As we do not 
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employ any public key infrastructure, great computational 
exponentiation is not needed.  
2. Related Work 
Since the innovative method that withstands the password 
guessing attacks was presented in 1989 by Lomas, Gong, 
Saltzer and Needham [6], there have been a several 
password-typed authenticated key agreement schemes 
were introduced.  
 
In 1996, Jablon [7] proposed a scheme were security 
relied on heuristic arguments. Also, in 1999 Halevi and 
Krawczyk [8] introduced another scheme, the scheme 
considered as inflexible for security of password-typed 
authenticated scheme. However, Boyarsky in 1999 [9] 
improved this scheme by making it secure in multi-user 
environment, but, this scheme is inappropriate for 
situation where communication has to be established 
between entities those sharing a common limited-entropy 
password. In 2000 [10], another password -typed key 
exchange scheme has been suggested by Boyko, 
MacKenzie and Patel. This scheme is relied on two-party 
password-typed scheme. An enhancement for this scheme 
was made to multi-party setting by Bresson, Chevassut 
and Pointcheval [11]. The security of Bresson, Chevassut 
and Pointcheval scheme is based on the arbitrary oracle 
approach and in the ideal cipher approach.  
 
In 2004, Lee, Kim, Kim and Yoo [12] suggested a 
verifiable-typed key agreement scheme. In this scheme, 
the entity employs a document of the password, while the 
server keeps as a verifier for the password. Thus the 
scheme cannot let an opponent who able to exchange 
information with the server to impersonate any entity 
without running the dictionary attack in the password file. 
But, the scheme is not protected against stolen-verifier 
attack as Kwon, in 2004[13] have claimed. Also, Yoon 
and Yoo Kin 2005 [14] proposed a two-party key 
agreement scheme relied on Diffie and Hellman scheme. 
Also, in 2006, Strangio [15] presented another two-party 
key agreement protocol relied also on Diffie and Hellman 
scheme. Both schemes are not appropriate for large 
networks since they cannot assume each party shares a 
secret password with other entity.  
 
However, the first work that copes with off-line dictionary 
attacks is introduced in 2007 by Bellovin and Merritt [16]. 
They presented a family of encrypted key exchange to 
resist dictionary attack. This protocol is very important 
and become the foundation for future work in this area. In 
2008, Shakir  Hussain and   Hussein Al-Bahadili [17] 
proposed simple authenticated key agreement protocol 
which is relied on Diffie and Hellman key agreement 
protocol. Unfortunately, this protocol is inefficient for 
practical use and does not allow concurrent executions. 
Also, this scheme is simple and cost effective. In 2009, 
SeongHan Shin, Kazukuni Kobara and Hideki Imai [18] 
introduced a scheme relied on threshold anonymous 
scheme. However, the scheme is complicated and costly.  
 
In this paper, we will briefly evaluate Lee, Kim, Kim and 
Yoo 2004 [12] key agreement scheme and show its 
weaknesses to stolen-verifier attack. Then, we introduce a 
new scheme that verifier-typed key agreement scheme. 
The new scheme resists password guessing attack and 
stolen-verifier attack. 
3. Lee, Kim and Yoo Scheme   
In 2004 Lee, Kim and Yoo [12] introduced a verifier 
based key agreement scheme. They claimed that the 
proposed scheme was secure in the case of server 
compromise. It indicates that when the hacker attacks the 
server, he cannot obtain sufficient information to pose as 
an entity without execution a dictionary attack on the 
password file.  Now, we briefly describe their scheme 
which is as follows: 
 
3.1 Notations Used 
A : Entity communicate with entity the sever B
B : Server entity 
v : Verifier computed by entity A  
P : The password 
q : Secure large prime number 
g : Generator in of order . *qZ 1−q
Aid : Identification of entity A  
Bid : Identification of entity  B
yx, : Two integer randomly selected numbers of order . *qZ
h : Secure one-way hash function. 
⊕ : The XOR function 
 
3.2 The Scheme Description 
Suppose that there is a secure one way hash 
function . The steps of the scheme are as 
follows: 
**}1,0{: qZh →
 
Step 1: Entity A   
1.1. Select a password P  
1.2. Find  ),,( Pididh BAgv =
1.3. Pass v  to the server entity B as the Verifier. 
1.4. Select an arbitrary number   *qZx∈
1.5. Find  vgT xA ⊕=
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1.6. Pass to server entity),( AA Tid B  
 
Step 2: Entity B   
2.1. Select an arbitrary number  *qZy∈
2.2. Find  vvT yB ⊕=
2.3. Find  yxyAB gvTr
*)( =⊕=
2.4. Compute  ),,(' BBAA rTidhd =
2.5. Find   ),,( AABB rTidhd =
2.6. Pass and to entityBT Bd A  
 
Step 3: Entity A  
3.1. Find  ))( *),,(*
1 yxPididhx
BA gvTr BA =⊕=
−
3.2. Compute  ),,( ABAA rTidhd =
3.3. Compute  ),,( AABB rTidhd =
3.4. pass to entityAd B   
 
Step 4: Entity B  
4.1. Verify if  entity'AA dd = B authenticates entity A  
4.2. Find the common session key  ).()( *yxA ghrhr ==
 
Step 5: Entity A  
5.1. Verify  entity'BB dd = A authenticates entity B  
5.2. Find the common session key . )()( *yxB ghrhr ==
 
3.3 Vulnerabilities 
Lee, Kim and Yoo claimed that the scheme was secure in 
the case of server compromise. But, in 2005 Shim and Seo 
[19] stated that the scheme was weak against stolen 
verifier attack. On the other hand, given the verifier, the 
hacker can impersonate an authorized entity A to negotiate 
a session key with the server entity B . The weakness of 
the scheme is that entity B  has not an efficient way to 
verify the message claimed to be sent by entity A . So, we 
develop the scheme of Lee, Kim and Yoo by introducing a 
new verifier-typed authenticated protocol, which resists 
against stolen verifier attack. 
4. The Proposed Password Scheme 
The description of the scheme is as follows: 
 
4.1 Algorithm of the Proposed Scheme 
The steps of the algorithm are as follows: 
 
Step 1: Entity A   
1.1. Select a password P  
),,( Pididh BAgv =  
1.3. Pass v  to the server entity B as the Verifier. 
to server en t
1.4. Select an arbitrary number *qZ∈   x
1.5. Find qgT xA mod=  
1.6. Pass tiAT y B  
Step 2: Entity B   
2.1. Select an rbia trary number
and to entit
*
qZy∈  
2.2. Find qvT yB mod=  
2.3. Pass yBT  A  
S itytep 3: Ent  A  
x 1*3.1. Find Tr )(= qPididhB BA mod),,( −  
e 3.2. Comput qrhd A mod)(=  
3.3. Pass Ad to entity B   
S tittep 4: En y B  
   4.1. Find hFA (= qT yA mod)  
 if4.2. Verify  AA dF =  entity authenticates entity B A  
4.3. Compute qmod  vE yB
2=
mmon session key
S
4.4. Find the co  ),,(( yABA Tididhr =  
tep 5: Entity A  
5.1. Verify qTTegEe pididxBBB BA mod),(),(
1),,( −= if yes, 
entity A authenticates entity B  
5.2. Find the common key 
1−
 session 
 
pon successfully implementing above scheme the two 
 
xample 
at the prim
qTididhr PididhxBBA BA mod),,(
),,(*= . 
U
entities, will agree on a shared session key 
),,( *yxBA gididhr = .  
E
Suppose th 10,12,9,6,13 ===== Pididgq BA  
Step 1: Entity A  
,12,9( == Pididh 13mod)6( == BAgv )10=  
   , then pass this result to entity 713mod6 )10129( == ++ B  
Suppose 3=x  
813mod6=∴ =xAT 3 = , send this value to entity B  
Step 2: Entity B  
   Suppose 4=y
4=
 
  7=∴ yBT 913mod = , and send this value to entity A  
Step 3: Entity A  
   Find r h)9( 10,,9(*3=
−
qmod
1)12 −  
)31(3 1 ====  
, send this value to enti
           (3 113mod913mod913mod9 24)8
 Comput tye 1mod)1( == qhd A B  
Step 4: Entity B  
   4.1. Find (= hFA 1mod)8 4 =q  1.2.  Find 
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4.2. Verify if  entity AA dF = authenticates entity B A  
4.3. Compute 913mod7mod
24 ==q  2= vE yB
the common ses  
 
4.2 Security Discussions 
oposed password typed key 
he pre-shared 
4.4. Find sion key
913mod4117)8,12,9(mod),,(( 4 ==== qTididhr yABA
We will show that the pr
agreement protocol is secure against both password 
guessing attack and stolen verifier attack.  
 
1. esist Man-in-Middle Attack: TR
password and verifier are employed to stop the man-in-
middle attack is easy because a hacker does not have 
the verifier or password; it means that the hacker 
cannot impersonate entity A to exchange information 
with entity B . 
Resist Dictionary Attack To the on-line password 2. : 
osed ario.  t
3. : Suppose that  hacker, 
guessing attack, the entities can overcome the hacker 
by selecting suitable trail intervals. In an off-line 
guessing attack, the hacker must repeatedly guess the 
password and check its accuracy by the message 
collected in an off-line approach. In the proposed 
scheme, the hacker is allowed to gather any message 
exchanged through the channel. It means that the 
hacker can get )(,, ** yxxyx ghgg , xyg *
2
since *, qZyx ∈   
are arbitrary nu  d uted i  
off-line dictionary attack is beaten. In ad ion, 
known xyg * and xxg *
2
a hacker cannot obtain yg by 
the prop  scen As a result, we can mention hat 
the suggested scheme is secure against dictionary 
attack. 
 
Resist Stolen Verifier Attack
mbers uniformly istrib n *qZ  the
dit
 a
entity has imposed entity B and obtained the verifier. 
A hacker goal is to impersonate entity A to negotiate a 
session key with entity B . We have the following 
theorem. 
eorem: A
 
h ssume that we have the key agreement T
protocol is secure against stolen verifier attack. 
Proof: In this scenario, hacker is allowed to select an 
arbitrary number *qZx∈ and finds xA gT = . We assume that 
the hacker has ap e to imperso entitytitud nate A . On the 
other hand, hacker must produce two resu s AT and 
Ad which satisfy AA dr =  
h is a robust
lt
 
s  one way hash function, obtained A
xg and g , hacker must calculate yg and then utilize this 
lt to calculate Ad hence verifier resu  r is indicated by xg . 
Clearly, it is different from the omplexity scen o 
illustrated previously. There is an alternative technique for 
hacker to impersonate entity A . Hacker can gather 
messages xyx gg *, and xyg *
2
then empt with the obtained 
result. B e scen o described previously is 
intractable. From depicted above we can summarize that 
the hacker cannot impersonate entity A even if he gets the 
verifier kept in Server and attempts to make stolen verifier 
attack. 
 
.3 Eff
c ari
iciency 
 proposed protocol ated to the costs 
 cost communications, the suggested protocol 
 att
ut, th ari
4
Efficiency of the  is rel
of communication and computation. Communication cost 
involves counting total number of rounds and total 
messages transmitted through the network during a 
protocol execution. Number of rounds is a critical concern 
in practical environments where number of group 
members is large. Compares the proposed protocol with 
Lee, Kim and Yoo password typed key agreement 
protocol.  
 
oncerningC
requires only two rounds while Kim and Yoo require 
n rounds; where every user sends one message in every 
round. Regarding the maximum bit length of messages 
sent per user during the execution of the proposed 
protocol is ||2 e such that |e| is the maximum size of an 
encrypted m ge compare with || en in Lee, Kim and 
Yoo password typed key agreemen tocol. Concerning 
the maximum number of point-to-point communication 
per user, the proposed protocol require 1
essa
t pro
+n while Lee, 
Kim and Yoo password typed key agre nt protocol 
require 22
eme
−n . To understand this case consider the users 
UU ,...,1 participating in the protocol are on a ring and 
1 are respectively the left and right neighbors of 
ni ≤≤1  such that 110 , UuUU nn == + . User 
1
n  
1, +− iiU U
for 
where
iU
iU 1 −≤≤ ni , sends a  only to 
 users d a message in round 2 to the rest of 
the 1
message in round 1
the n11, +− ii UU a
−n  u ilst the last user nU  sends one message 
in each round to all the 1−n users. These will make the 
proposed protocol eff nt from communication 
viewpoint. 
 
egarding 
sers wh
icie
cost computation, in the proposed protocol R
every group member executes at most 3 modular 
exponentiations compared with n2  in Lee, Kim and Yoo 
protocol. Also, the proposed pro col requires 4 one-way 
hash function evaluations, 2 encryptions and 1
to
+n  
decryption operations. The operations dependent on th  
number of group members are the asymmetric key 
decryption operation, compared with 1 encryption and 2 
decryptions in Lee, Kim and Yoo protocol. The total cost 
e
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of computation is highly reduced compared to Lee, Kim 
and Yoo protocol password typed key agreement protocol. 
We use asymmetric key encryption and decryption. Hence 
the proposed protocol attains efficiency in both 
communication and computation costs. The constant 
round protocol can be implemented for a large group of 
participants as compared to Lee, Kim and Yoo protocol 
password typed protocol which becomes not practical if 
100>n . 
5. Conclusions 
have shown that Lee, Kim and Yoo 
yped key agreement protocol is vulnerable to 
el characteristic and different environment 
eed to be studied to determine further useful relations. 
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Sattar ree in 1976.  In 1982, he earned 
s Master degree in computing science. A Ph.D. was received in 1988 in 
In this paper, we 
password-t
the password guessing attack and stolen verifier attack. To 
avoid these attacks, we presented a modified verifier-typed 
key agreement scheme relied on Lee, Kim and Yoo 
protocol and demonstrate that the propose scheme resists 
against password guessing attack and stolen verifier 
attack. According to the security analysis, it is obvious 
that the modified protocol is secure enough to withstand 
all possible mentioned attacks. Constructing password 
schemes using authenticated key agreement has received 
high attention in the last decade. In practice, password-
typed protocols are appropriate for implementation in 
many situations, especially where no device is able of 
securely storing high-entropy long-term secret key. As we 
are mentioned, password has low entropy and is 
vulnerable to dictionary attack and man-in-middle attack, 
researchers must be cautious in construction password-
typed scheme. 
 
Different chann
n
Since multiple channels might increase overheads, studies 
might be done to consider the best environment 
combinations to reach high security at the least cost. Work 
also remains to be done to formalize these schemes 
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